Introduction
Defenders of minimum voting age argue that it is reasonable to require competence from those who participate in collective decisions that are enforced coercively. A minimum voting age is regarded as the most effective and least disrespectful way to ensure a sufficiently competent electorate. In this paper I argue that a minimum voting age should be rejected as a means of ensuring a sufficiently competent electorate. A minimum voting age relies on an unreasonably controversial conception of political maturity that would fail to win acceptance from all qualified points of view. Political maturity also fails to provide a determinate threshold for sufficient competence. As age is a proxy for sufficient maturity, and as sufficient maturity is subject to vagueness, age as a threshold of competence should be rejected. A minimum voting age may remain justified in the absence of a less controversial, vague, and disrespectful alternative. I present such an alternative in the form of a procedural test for minimum electoral competence. This test avoids problems of reasonable rejectability and vagueness of political maturity, and is less harmful to the self-esteem of those less than minimally qualified. It also fulfils adults' duties of appraisal respect to children more effectively than a minimum voting age.
It affords minimally competent children the opportunity to participate directly in democracy through voting. This is the most effective way of promoting the development of children's democratic agency.
A procedural test for minimum electoral competence is therefore preferable, all things considered, to a minimum voting age.
I begin in section two by clarifying the nature of the argument in favour of a minimum voting age.
Section three evaluates this justification, and finds the reasons taken in favour of a minimum voting age weaker then proposed by defenders. In section four I argue that respect for children requires their direct participation in elections. Section five sets out an alternative test to ensure that those children lacking minimal competence are excluded, whilst protecting their self-esteem. I conclude that, all things considered, we should be against a minimum voting age and in favour of a procedural test for minimum electoral competence.
On the Nature and Justification of a Minimum Voting Age

a. Democracy, Citizenship, and a Minimum Voting Age
What kind of problem is posed by a minimum voting age? At first sight, it may seem a problem of democratic inclusion: is it justified to exclude minors from the demos?
1 Taken thus, a minimum voting age is part of the broader question of how a demos should be constituted. The constitution problem asks: which normative principle should govern the formation of the demos? Those whose interests are affected by a collective decision have a potent claim to inclusion in the collective. 2 Children's interests are clearly affected by collective decisions, both as children (e.g. education and family policy), and as future adults (e.g. pension and environmental policy). A minimum voting age appears to create a boundary between children whose interests are affected by collective decisions and the collective that decides. Thus Richard Holt argues, 'I want the right to vote for people of any age. No one should be left out… If I am going to be affected by what you decide, I should have a say in it' (Holt 1974, p.118) .
Holt implies that a minimum voting age violates the all affected interests principle for the constitution of democracy.
A minimum voting age certainly creates a boundary to participation in democratic decisions.
But on closer examination, a minimum voting age does not necessarily exclude children from the constitution of the demos. Rather, it assumes inclusion of minors in the demos, but excludes them from participation in collective decisions. The question of who should be included in the composition of the demos differs from the question of who should be included in the decision procedures of a collective. The former concerns whose interests should be considered in a decision, whilst the latter concerns who should participate in the decision. (Mason 2011, p.268) . Any inequality of standing amongst citizens requires justification. It is reasonable for a citizenry to require competency from participants in collective decisions that are enforced coercively. This is reasonable on two counts. First, individuals may suffer harm as a result of coercively enforced collective decisions.
Therefore, it is reasonable to demand that those participating in collective decisions meet a threshold of competency that reduces the risk of harm to others (Brennan 2011, p.704; Christiano 2001, p.197) .
Second, it is reasonable to require that those participating in collective decisions be capable of responsibility for their choices. It is harmful to attribute responsibility for choices to persons incapable of responsibility (Beckman 2009, p.116; Schapiro 2003, p.576) . The competency requirement justifies excluding unqualified citizens from participation in collective decisions. Third, how is the threshold enforced? A minimum voting age is defended as the most reasonable response to these questions. Whilst details vary, defenders of a minimum voting age tend to agree that electoral competence involves a combination of epistemic and moral capacities that together constitute political maturity (Beckman 2009, p.91; Clayton 2006, p.193; C. Cohen 1975, p.461; López-Guerra 2012, pp.125-127; Rehfeld 2011, pp.143-146; Schrag 1975, p.453; Lau 2012, pp.3-5) . A threshold of sufficient rationality and moral responsibility is required to participate in collective decisions (Chan & Clayton 2006, pp.554-555; Brennan 2011) . Enforcement of a threshold through direct testing is regarded as problematic. Some children will reach the threshold of sufficient political maturity before they reach the age of majority. Age as a proxy for sufficient political maturity therefore denies competent minors their legitimate entitlement of equal standing as citizens.
Defenders of a minimum voting age tend to agree that this is a wrong perpetrated against competent minors, but that it is justified all things considered. (Holt 1974, pp.129-130; C. Cohen 1975, p.454; Weale 2007, p.213; Overton 2007) . Second, a substantive test would deny citizenship as equal membership to those who fail. This impaired citizenship risks significant harm to the self-esteem of those deemed failures. Defenders of an age test argue that in the course of a normal life all will pass the age test with no harm to self-esteem (Clayton 2006, p.187; Rawls 1999, p.196; C. Cohen 1975, p.455; Weale 2007, p.214) . Third, age is a non-permanent feature of a person's identity. Consequently, discrimination on the basis of age will end eventually, unlike discrimination on the basis of gender or race (Brighouse & Fleurbaey 2010, pp.148-9; Clayton 2006, pp.187-89) . Fourth, age is a more transparent and publicly defensible criterion than contested notions of maturity or capacity. Consequently, a minimum voting age is the most legitimate criterion available for the constitution of the deciders (Brighouse & Fleurbaey 2010, p.149) . Whilst competent minors suffer wrongful exclusion from the franchise, this is a justified means of enforcing the competency requirement, given that a minimum voting age is the least disrespectful test available. A minimum voting age therefore relies on an all things considered justification.
Evaluating Age as a Proxy for Sufficient Political Maturity
a. Political Maturity as Unreasonably Controversial
Legitimacy demands that principles for determining participation in collective decisions must be acceptable to all reasonable points of view (Estlund 2008, p.33) . Any conception of political maturity would involve a substantive account of epistemic and moral expertise in order to determine a threshold for qualification. But neither epistemic nor moral expertise confer democratic authority. This commits the expert/boss fallacy (Estlund 2008, p.22) . Democratic authority is constituted by consent and not expertise. Any substantive conception of epistemic expertise would also be open to the objection that it favoured the prejudices and biases of a particular demographic (Estlund 2008, pp.43-45) . Similarly, any substantive conception of moral expertise would be unreasonably controversial.
Amongst a group of reasonable citizens, a conception of moral expertise would rank citizens as more or less expert. This ranking would give those deemed morally better qualified good reason to ignore the moral reasoning of those regarded as less qualified. A conception of moral expertise would therefore be reasonably rejectable by the less qualified. In order to avoid such controversy and provide democratic legitimacy, a second order agreement on the nature of moral competency to which all assent would be required. As such an agreement depends on the mutual recognition of the competency of others, this negates a competence ranking. Thus a ranking of moral competence is either fated to irresolvable controversy, or evaporation into equal respect for competence to ensure agreement (Christiano 2001, pp.212-214) .
Political maturity involves a substantive conception of epistemic and moral competency. It would be reasonable for individuals to disagree about any given conception as a basis for participation in collective decisions. Political maturity is therefore unreasonably controversial as a property for determining participation in collective decisions. If a minimum voting age is a proxy for political maturity, and if political maturity is unreasonably controversial as a property for determining participation in collective decisions, then this counts heavily against a minimum voting age.
b. Political Maturity, Vagueness, and the Sorites Paradox
Political maturity is unreasonably controversial as a conception of electoral competency. A threshold of sufficient maturity is also rejectable because it is vague and entails a logical paradox. No one would deny that an 18 year old minus 1 day is not mature, nor an eighteen year old minus 2 days. So when does the notion of political maturity no longer apply? There is no determinate point at which we can say that an 18 year old ceases to be mature, and becomes immature. This lack of a clear point at which the concept of maturity no longer applies reveals that political maturity is a vague concept, subject to the sorites paradox. As such, we cannot provide a determinate threshold of sufficient polical maturity.
The sorites paradox refers to a logical problem in the application of certain vague concepts.
For example, we would not refer to one grain of wheat as a heap of wheat. But we would refer to 1,000,000 grains of wheat as a heap. We would also refer to 1,000,000 minus 1 grains of wheat as a heap. But as there is no clear point at which the subtraction of one grain of wheat makes the concept of heap inapplicable. We end up in the paradoxical situation where there is no point before we are left with one grain of wheat where the concept heap becomes inapplicable. Consequently we are logically compelled to apply the predicate 'is a heap' to an object that is not a heap: a single grain of wheat. By extension, as there is no determinate point at which the concept of political maturity becomes inapplicable, we are compelled by logic to say a 1 year old is politically mature. This is paradoxical because the concept of political maturity does not apply to a 1 year old. Therefore, age is not a reliable proxy threshold because of the vagueness of its referent: political maturity.
A defender of a minimum voting age may recognise problems of vagueness and sorites paradox. They may maintain that a minimum voting age is nevertheless reasonable, given our preferences both to include all sufficiently competent children in the franchise and to maintain the quality of democratic decisions. Matthew Clayton defends a minimum voting age on such grounds by drawing on Warren Quinn's example of a self-torturer. Clayton claims that whilst political maturity suffers from vagueness, it is reasonable to pick a determinate age as a matter of maintaining the rationality of our preferences regarding the franchise. In Quinn's example, a person is attached to a device that causes an imperceptible increase in pain each time its dial is moved up a notch from 0-1,000 (Clayton 2006, p.195; Quinn 1993) . The person is offered $10,000 each time the dial is moved irreversibly upwards. Quinn argues that in each decision about whether to take the money and receive an imperceptible increase in pain, it seems to be rational to take the money as the cost is imperceptible. Over time, this person would be a millionaire in excruciating pain. This suggests a problem in rationality because whilst a person prefers both more money and pain on each individual occasion (he prefers 1 to 0, 2 to 1, etc.) he does not prefer great riches and unbearable pain to neither (he does not prefer 1,000 to 0). Quinn points to a problem in rational choice theory where transitivity of pairwise choices can produce intransitivity when iterated cumulatively over a large enough set when the cost of each pairwise choice is imperceptible (prefers 1 to 0, 2 to 1, but 0 to 1,000). Quinn argues that an agent must adopt a prior choice strategy that identifies the point at which transitivity of preferences is maintained, and at which he is in a better position than when at 0 with no extra money and no extra pain. But Quinn emphasises that this solution involves suspension of an important axiom in rational choice theory: that choosers do not readjust a prior choice strategy of identifying a stopping point in a series of choices, even if the readjustment would better fulfil a person's preferences.
Clayton argues that the problem of where to set a voting age is comparable to the case of the self-torturer. We may prefer to reduce the voting age from 18 years to 17 years and 364 days to include as many sufficiently capable children as possible at the cost of an imperceptible decline in quality of democratic decisions. However, each pairwise choice would take us cumulatively to a minimum voting age that would produce poorer democratic decisions, which we would not prefer. It is therefore rational to select a reasonable age in advance of each pairwise choice about age. This provides a determinate threshold for sufficient political maturity and maintains the transitivity of our preferences between pairwise choices of voting ages and quality of democratic outcomes. However, Clayton's borrowing of Quinn's proposed solution to the puzzle of the self-torturer fails as a defence of a minimum voting age.
Clayton's argument relies on a parallel between the puzzle of the self-torturer and the puzzle of a minimum voting age. In Clayton's version of the puzzle, our preferences regarding voting age and quality of democratic outcomes replace our preferences for money and pain. However, these preferences do not generate the same puzzle and we cannot therefore borrow the same solution. I take it that Clayton supposes that our preferences against pain are equivalent to our preferences against poor democratic decisions; and that our preferences for money are equivalent to our preferences for including all sufficiently mature in the electorate. However, these preferences are not equivalent to those in Quinn's example. They differ because age is a proxy for a property about which we have a direct preference: political maturity. Age is not the object of our preferences. As we have argued above, political maturity is a vague concept that is subject to the sorites paradox. This means that we cannot give a determinate quantification of political maturity. The predicate 'heap' may apply both to 1 grain and to 1,000,000 grains; the predicate 'politically mature' may apply both to a 1 year old and a 100 year old. The vagueness of political maturity makes it an inappropriate object for preferences about which we can make rational choices.
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Quinn accepts that preferences involving vagueness are not susceptible to rational choice, and do not generate the puzzle. The puzzle depends on the determinate measurement of preferences between each pairwise choice of money and pain (Quinn 1993, p.202 Children are owed respect because, like adults, they are persons with the capacity for autonomy.
Whilst children might possess the innate capacity to develop autonomy, that development does not occur ineluctably: it requires formation. The child's autonomy must be encouraged and promoted, guided and advised. However, whilst the formation of the child's autonomy is promoted by an agent other than the child, the child contributes to this formation. The child's contribution is required because practical reasoning and behaviour must be personal and independent. The child's agency develops only through a child's own exercise of their capacities for choice. A conception of children's agency must therefore recognise its duality. On the one hand, children lack the full range of cognitive, volitional, psychological, and moral capacities that are regarded as sufficient to be fully autonomous.
On the other hand, the acquisition of autonomy requires the exercise of these capacities in a progressively independent way by the child themselves.
Children beyond infancy will therefore develop their own interests and reasons progressively. at a skill or practice (Darwall 1977) . To pay someone recognition respect is to constrain one's behaviour according to appropriate considerations that attach to facts about persons. Appraisal respect is owed to the child's accomplishments at acquiring the skills of moral agency. Appraisal respect is a scalar attitude, owed proportionate to the degree of accomplishment, and will therefore track the progress of a child's autonomy. Appraisal respect is in this sense crucial to a child's moral development as it provides a practical pedagogical framework of assessment and accountability. The child's nascent agency requires due consideration by the adult and this consideration places moral constraints on the adult's behaviour toward the child. The clearest constraint will be on disregarding the reasons and choices of the child as not worth consideration. We can therefore see that it is a moral obligation, based on the recognition respect owed children, to give appropriate consideration to the child's progressive autonomy. Given that the child's progressive autonomy is owed recognition respect, the adult's contribution to the child's development will be informed and constrained by the child's moral agency; however, given that the adult is also required to appraise the development of the child's moral capacities, the adult will also provide guidance, appreciation, and criticism where appropriate.
Duties of recognition and appraisal respect are owed by adults to children directly in their interpersonal relationships, but also indirectly through institutions. Adults have duties of respect in their dealings with children, but also to create and sustain social, economic, and political institutions that recognise and promote children's autonomy. Children are owed these indirect duties of respect because the basic social, economic, and political institutions are pervasive in effect over children's lives. 6 Consequently, they form part of the background conditions for the development of children's autonomy. The indirect institutional duties owed by adults to children form part of the civic dimension of adults' duties of respect to children. Adults owe children recognition and appraisal respect through direct interpersonal duties, and indirect institutional duties. These indirect institutional duties apply to democracy.
b. Duties of Respect and the Enfranchisement of Child-Citizens
We recall that a minimum voting age is typically justified alongside the democratic incorporation of children's interests. As such, a minimum voting age goes some way towards fulfilling duties of recognition respect towards child-citizens. Democratic incorporation requires that adults include the of democratic incorporation will provide varying accounts of how children's interests should be recognised: whether imaginatively or through direct consultation. The moral effect should be the same however, namely that children's independent interests are recognised and included in democratic decisions. Thus a minimum voting age paired with a conception of democratic incorporation may, to a large extent, fulfil civic duties of recognition respect towards children. But a minimum voting age and democratic incorporation do little to fulfil duties of appraisal respect towards child-citizens.
Adults are obliged to include children in the franchise as a matter of appraisal respect. Moral and political agency is developed best through appropriately administered opportunities for its direct exercise. Adults therefore owe children the opportunity to exercise the capacities for democratic citizenship directly. As a matter of appraisal respect, these opportunities must be commensurate with their stage of development, and allow their capacities for democratic citizenship to develop progressively. Direct participation in democratic elections provides the most suitable opportunity for children to develop their capacities for democratic citizenship progressively. Voting in elections enables children to experience democratic citizenship directly, whilst providing an appropriate developmental framework for children's rational and moral agency.
Voting is appropriately developmental on three grounds. First, it allows children to develop the capacities for democratic citizenship through direct performance. Surrogate democratic practices such as voting for school councils or youth parliaments are inadequate because they fail to provide the same quality of experience as elections in the main polity. Children are given direct experience of democratic citizenship by engaging with the real questions facing a democracy and attempting to comprehend the issues and respond independently. Just as children develop morally by making progressively more demanding real moral choices, children will develop democratically by making real democratic choices. Second, voting in elections provides direct experience of democracy whilst simultaneously protecting the least qualified children from affecting electoral outcomes. This protects children from being held responsible for decisions that may be beyond their stage of development.
The Condorcet Jury Theorem shows that so long as the mean voter competence is better than random, adding voters who are less competent will in fact improve the quality of outcomes (Goodin & List 2001; Goodin 2003, pp.91-108; Goodin & Lau 2011; Olsson 2008) . Indeed, Goodin and List show where there are multiple choices on the ballot, the quality of outcomes will be preserved even if voters who choose the incorrect option are in the majority. This is because those voting for incorrect answers will choose different kinds of incorrect answer, so there will not be a plurality for any one incorrect answer. Therefore, even if all enfranchised children always vote for the 'incorrect' option, this will not harm or the quality of a polity's democratic outcomes (Goodin 2003, pp.98-99; Goodin & List 2001, p.283) . But it will provide children with the opportunity to develop by making democratic choices directly. The third reason that voting is appropriately developmental is that it encourages children to begin reflecting on the quality of the beliefs that inform their electoral choices. As Goodin argues, participating in elections provides evidence that can inform the formation and revision of beliefs. As children begin participating in elections and making choices, they will be faced with comparing their choice with that of the majority. Any difference between the decision of the child and the majority acts as a prompt for reflection by the child on their choice. A discrepancy between the vote of the child and majority provides strong grounds for revising their preferences. Thus, democracy can act as a 'Baysian persuader' (Goodin 2003, p.110) . 7 Participating directly in elections encourages children to clarify their choices, and makes clear the difference between their choices and that of the majority.
Thus the Baysian dimension of democracy has an important pedagogical role which helps children develop their capacities for democratic citizenship. This pedagogical dimension of democracy helps fulfil adults' indirect institutional duties of appraisal respect to child-citizens. 8 Voting provides opportunities to develop democratically through direct experience of democracy; in a context where the law of large numbers provides safety from responsibility for outcomes; and where the decisions of the majority provide a prompt for reflection and revision of children's democratic choices.
an age test fails to fulfil duties of appraisal respect to child-citizens adequately. However, they may maintain that, absent a less disrespectful alternative, a minimum voting age remains the most reasonable response to the competency requirement. But an alternative test is available that responds adequately to the competency requirement, and fulfils our duties of appraisal respect to children more fully. What would such a test consist in?
A Procedural Test for Minimum Electoral Competence
a. Electoral Competence as Literacy and Independence
Political maturity is reasonably rejectable as a basis for inclusion in the franchise because it is unreasonably controversial. This problem arises largely because the substantive conceptions of political maturity proposed involve a thick notion of epistemic and moral capacity: capacities such as knowledge of political parties; civic institutions; and moral values of freedom and justice. But political maturity is unreasonably controversial not simply because it involves a conception of epistemic and moral capacity, but because such conceptions are too thick. We may however define a thinner notion of electoral competence that is acceptable to all qualified points of view.
It is reasonable for members of modern democratic polities to demand that all voters be literate and capable of participating in collective decisions independently. Those who are illiterate face significant disadvantages in acquiring basic information on the salient issues. Lacking the capacity to acquire at least the basic information about electoral choices, it is reasonable to doubt they have the epistemic ability to participate competently in coercively enforced collective decisions. Being literate does not imply substantive knowledge of or expertise in any subject and thus avoids the expert/boss fallacy. Likewise, literacy is a generic competence that is not associated with the epistemic perspective or expertise of any particular demographic group and therefore avoids the demographic objection. As it avoids both the expert/boss fallacy and the demographic objection, literacy is acceptable to all qualified points of view as part of a conception of electoral competence. Those dependent on others may be reasonably assumed to lack the capacity to form independent moral commitments. Their dependence makes them especially vulnerable to influence and manipulation by others. Consequently they lack the independence required to be held responsible for their electoral choices. The ability to make an electoral choice independently does not imply moral expertise. The ability to choose independently requires an individual to be able to identify, weigh, and adopt or reject reasons as considerations. But the ability to reason practically says nothing about the quality of the reasoning. Individuals may reason with varying degrees of expertise. Requiring independent choice ensures that individuals are not held responsible for decisions that were not their own either through duress, manipulation, or incompetence. A capacity for literacy and independence constitute a conception of electoral competence. These requirements for electoral competence are sufficiently thin to be reasonably acceptable by all qualified points of view.
b. A Threshold of Minimum Literacy and Independence
We recall that age as a proxy threshold of sufficient electoral competence was reasonably rejectable because of the vagueness of political maturity. Literacy and independence allow for more determinate and transparent measurement. The literacy required of voters can be tested by requiring they provide in person their name, address, date of birth, and sign to consent to the rules of the ballot. 9 The capacity for independent democratic choice may be tested by making voter registration and voting voluntary and private. A test of a voter's ability to provide their name, address, date of birth, and to read and sign a simple affirmation of the rules of the ballot is transparent and determinate. It is a direct test for a property that is reasonably required of voters in modern democracies. It offers clear criteria for evaluation. The capacity to vote independently may also be tested directly according to a clear and determinate threshold. Personal voluntary attendance at a voter registration office with private registration sessions ensures independent ability to comprehend and consent to the rules of the ballot. Casting a vote in a private booth also confirms the independence of the elector. This does not guarantee the independence of voters' democratic choices. But it allows those who might be voting under duress or undue influence an opportunity for independent choice, and prevents those wholly incapable of independent choice from participating. Literacy and independence allow for determinate measurement, and so avoid political maturity's problems of vagueness Age as a proxy threshold for sufficient political maturity was not only objectionable because vague, but because it failed to fulfil duties of appraisal respect to all children. A threshold of sufficient maturity for voting prevents children from developing their nascent democratic agency through the practice of voting. As argued above, adults' have duties of appraisal respect to allow children to develop the capacities for democratic citizenship. Fulfilment of these duties demands that all children capable of benefiting developmentally from the experience of voting be enfranchised. It seems reasonable to assume that those children who are incapable of completing a form asking for their basic details are not yet able to benefit developmentally from voting. Consequently duties of appraisal respect demand that the threshold of literacy be set low enough to include all those capable of benefitting developmentally from voting. Appraisal respect therefore demands that a threshold be set at the minimum level to include all children capable of benefiting developmentally from the experience of voting.
A defender of a minimum voting age may accept that voting provides developmental benefits, but argue that other considerations count against minimal electoral competence as a threshold for enfranchisement. First, they may object that the argument from the Condorcet Jury
Theorem only holds if the mean competence remains better than random. Enfranchising minimally literate children will violate this parameter and therefore reduce the quality of democratic outcomes (López-Guerra 2012, p.122) . A minimum threshold of literacy and independence therefore violates the competence requirement. Second, those who are only minimally independent will suffer greater vulnerability to manipulation, and so may adopt the view of the majority uncritically. Democracy's Baysian dimension may therefore threaten rather than enhance children's nascent independence (Goodin 2003, pp.122-123) . These considerations count in favour of sufficient political maturity as a threshold for voting as it excludes insufficiently developed and vulnerable citizens.
Minimal literacy maintains the parameters of the Condorcet Jury Theorem. A requirement for minimum literacy is an effective means to ensure that mean voter competence remains better than random. Those who are not minimally literate are likely to pick randomly as they would be unable to read basic election literature and even to read the ballot sheet. Those who are able to complete a voter self-registration form and ballot paper have a minimum ability to identify and express a preference. Even those children who express poorly informed and transitory preferences exceed the requirement that a voter not pick randomly. By excluding those almost certain to pick randomly we protect the conditions for the application Condorcet Jury Theorem. Thus a test for minimal literacy ensures that less developed children benefit developmentally from participation in elections, whilst protecting them and the polity from any poor decisions they make.
Defenders of a minimum voting age worry legitimately that minimally literate and independent children may be easily persuaded to vote according to their parents' wishes. As Even if all adults behaved scrupulously towards children vulnerable to manipulation, minimally developed children may feel insecure about their own views when faced with an opposing majority.
They may subsequently fail to develop their own independent point of view, being in thrall to the probable truth of the majority. Thus the persuasiveness of the majority may impede fulfilment of adults' duties of appraisal respect to children. But there are two reasons why the problem of the persuasiveness of the majority should concern us less as it applies to minimally competent children.
First, as Goodin points out, votes are expressions of both epistemic and moral judgments (Goodin 2003, p.144) . Consequently, the activity of voting will stimulate the moral aspect of children's democratic agency. As Goodin goes on to argue though, moral commitments are unaffected by the Bayesian aspect of democracy as these are not constituted by probabilistic judgments about evidence.
Thus, children's moral independence is promoted by allowing minimally competent children to vote, whilst the majority's choice lacks moral persuasiveness. Second, the epistemic persuasiveness of the majority has a positive role to play for children pedagogically. The development of children's democratic agency will benefit from reflection on any disparity between their choice and that of a majority. Consequently, some children may be aware of being incapable of, and therefore disallowed from, performing a task other children relatively close in age perform. However, a procedural test for minimum electoral competence is not preferable to a minimum voting age because it has no detrimental effect on any child's self-esteem. Rather, it is preferable because it is less harmful to children's self-esteem than a minimum voting age. As the threshold of the procedure is set so low, it affects fewer children who are less aware of the implications of the test than a minimum voting age.
The defence of age as a proxy test for electoral competence relied on the absence of a reasonable and feasible alternative that was less disrespectful. A procedural test for minimal electoral competence is reasonably acceptable and determinate, and so enforces the competency requirement reasonably and effectively. A procedural test for minimum electoral competence also ensures that less developed children benefit developmentally from participation in election. Consequently, it fulfils adults' indirect duties of appraisal respect to children better than a minimum voting age.
Conclusion
It is reasonable for a polity to demand that only competent voters participate in collective decisions that are enforced coercively. A minimum voting age suffers from the reasonable rejectability and vagueness of political maturity as a basis for granting suffrage. The proxy test of age also disrespects sufficiently developed minors. It remains preferred because an alternative seems absent. A procedural test for minimum electoral competence offers an alternative. Self-registration and private voting are procedural tests for minimum literacy and independent choice. Completion of a simple selfregistration form and private voting are thin enough tests to avoid reasonable rejection by all qualified point of view, and are determinate not vague. The minimal literacy and agency required to complete the procedure of voting also maintains the parameters of the Condorcet Jury Theorem. This ensures that children's votes will not affect the quality of electoral outcomes detrimentally. A procedural test for minimum electoral competence succeeds in excluding those who should not participate in collective decisions that are enforced coercively. It also fulfils indirect institutional duties of appraisal respect to children and promotes children's independent democratic agency. Voting is an effective way to promote children's democratic agency. It provides opportunities to engage directly in real epistemic and moral deliberation. Voting prompts children to make democratic choices, and creates feedback through the results of elections that facilitate children's reflections on their choices.
A procedural test for minimum electoral competence also protects the self-esteem of those excluded.
Lacking minimal literacy and independence they will be largely unaware of the nature of the electoral test, and their inability to complete it. As more acceptable, determinate, and respectful, a procedural test for minimum electoral competence should therefore be preferred to a minimum voting age, all things considered.
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concerns those institutions and practices that are of profound importance over children's lives, not only those that are pervasive and coercive in effect (Clayton 2006, p.37) and (G. A. Cohen 1997) 7 Baysian reasoning refers to the process by which we update our beliefs in the light of new evidence.
As Goodin argues, if votes are evidence of other peoples' rational beliefs, the decisions of the majority provide important evidence in the process of reflection and updating of our beliefs (Goodin 2003, pp.109-121) . 8 My focus here is on adults' indirect institutional duties of appraisal respect to child-citizens, and how the institution of voting fulfils these. I leave aside further discussion of the direct duties adults have towards the development of democratic citizenship in children, but it seems plausible that adults would have duties to promote the Baysian role of democracy by encouraging discussion and reflection on a child's vote and the outcome of elections. 9 Justice requires the polity to provide such forms in all languages spoken in the polity, as otherwise this would amount to a substantive test of expertise in a particular language.
